
%\chapter[Environment, Safety, and Health]
%{Environment, Safety, and Health Considerations for the Neutrino Source}
\section{Introduction}

The Neutrino Factory presents a number of challenges in the general
area of environment, safety, and health.  Here we identify  
these challenges and make a preliminary assessment
of how they might be addressed and of their potential impact on the
project.  Many of these issues are very similar to those that have
been encountered and solved during the construction and operation of
other accelerator facilities at BNL and elsewhere, while others are
novel.  The novel ones will require particular attention
as the project proceeds to ensure their timely resolution in a
cost-effective manner that meets the approval of the Laboratory, the
Department of Energy and the public.  With
adequate planning in the design stages, these problems can be
adequately addressed in a manner that merits their support.

\section{Procedural/Regulatory Matters}

The actual design, construction, and operation of the Neutrino Factory
will have to meet a number of procedural/regulatory milestones in the
area of environment, safety, and health to ensure its success.  Devoting 
early attention to these issues is likely the best way to
enhance public support of the project.  Design, analytical and
operational requirements are currently provided in the BNL Standards
Based Management System (SBMS) Accelerator Safety and Hazard Analysis
Subject Areas, as well as the applicable SBMS Subject Areas on
environmental protection \cite{esh:1}.

\subsection{Environmental Protection}

All new DOE projects are subject to the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).  In accordance with 
NEPA and the Cultural Resources Evaluations Subject Area \cite{esh:1},
the project will generate an Environmental Evaluation Notification
Form and request the funding agencies (DOE and/or NSF), to make a 
determination on the level of documentation needed to 
comply with NEPA. Based on the proposed design and
past determinations on other accelerator projects, an Environmental
Assessment (EA) should be sufficient and would be the expectation of
the determination that the funding agencies will make.  The decision making 
process and
content of the EA is prescribed in NEPA, along with the requirement to
seek public comment.  The conclusion of the EA process is either a
Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) or a determination of need to
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).  The NEPA process is
rigorous, but one that BNL has the expertise to conduct and complete.
This task must be completed, customarily by using external resources,
prior to expenditure of project funds.  Other procedural requirements
apply in the arena of environmental protection in the form of
environmental permits that will be needed for construction.  This was
the case for the previous RHIC Project. Any permits that apply to
operations will be identified if and when the EA identifies
regulated effluents.  Topics covered by such permits include stormwater
water discharges, discharges of cooling water, wetlands mitigation,
releases of air pollutants for both non-radioactive pollutants and for
radionuclides, and construction permits.  Historical sites have
previously been identified on the BNL site that will be reviewed in
the NEPA process.

\subsection[Environment Regulatory
  Compliance ]{Environment, Safety and Health Procedural and Regulatory
  Compliance}

The Laboratory will be required to prepare an assessment of the
environment, safety, and health issues associated with this project in
the form of a Safety Assessment Document (SAD).  Since the project
will be a Major System Acquisition, the preparation of a Preliminary
Safety Assessment Document (PSAD) is required as a scooping document
for the hazards involved in construction and operation. The PSAR will
also be the basis for the EA and must be completed and reviewed by the 
funding agencies 
before funding is approved to start construction.  The main purpose of
the PSAD is to identify the relevant ES\&H issues at an early stage and
propose how they might be mitigated.  The SAD will later document their
resolution in the final detailed design of the architecture
and components of the machine.  It is customary for the funding agencies 
to review
these safety documents by utilizing an external independent review
team throughout the preliminary and final design stages.  DOE is
presently ``self-regulating'' in the areas of industrial safety and
occupational radiation protection.  This situation could change at
some future time if external regulation is applied to DOE facilities.
Related developments are being monitored closely to identify new
requirements or procedures that might apply to new projects such as
the Neutrino Factory.

\section{Occupational Safety During Construction of the Facility}

The beamlines all would be located at or just below grade, but above
the water table.  At this level, construction is likely to proceed by
the standard ``cut and fill'' method.  The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration regulations (OSHA) in 29 CFR 1926 apply to the
construction activities. These rules are delegated down to BNL staff and
contractors through SBMS and general conditions specified in
contracts, as appropriate.  There are no unconventional occupational
safety issues expected to be associated with the construction work.
The beamlines and target station will be heavily shielded to reduce
onsite and offsite exposure from prompt radiation. The shielding will
typically be constructed with a sand berm as has been employed by
other accelerators at BNL. The production target will require a more
dense and complex shield matrix to reduce prompt radiation and protect
the groundwater in the vicinity, but the design will not present any
special problems with respect to conventional construction.

\section{Environmental Protection During the Construction of the Facility}

The Laboratory as an institution is registered to the ISO 14001
Environmental Management System (EMS) \cite{esh:1}, which will be used
as the platform to identify Environmental Aspects and Impacts during
construction. The EMS process will identify Operational Controls to
ensure that legal and other requirements are maintained to protect the
environment and provide the framework to manage the environmental
aspects.

Based on past experience with the conventional construction at
RHIC, environmental protection must be addressed during the conceptual
design phase. With respect to the restoration of the forested area
that will be disturbed to build the beamlines, only the area of the
beam enclosure will be cleared to minimize this impact. If
additional fill material is needed to construct sand berms for
shielding, clean fill will be brought in from off-site without
disturbing any existing vegetated land. A plan to restore the
environment will be required to facilitate regrowth of the vegetation
on the disturbed land and over the newly constructed beamlines.

\subsection{Ordinary Operational Occupational Safety Hazards}

The operational occupational safety hazards typically encountered at
BNL and other large particle accelerator facilities will be found in
this facility.  These have been successfully addressed by well-known
techniques and are simply listed below:
\begin{itemize}
\item High current electrical circuits will be used in the
  magnets on a large scale.
\item High power radio-frequency (rf) generation and distribution equipment 
  will be used extensively.
\item Large numbers of cables will be installed in cable trays, 
  with associated fire protection implications.
\item Long tunnels will be present, with corresponding egress and fire
  protection issues to be addressed.
\item Large, heavy components will have to be moved and aligned.
\end{itemize}

\section{Novel Occupational Safety Hazards}

\subsection{Use of Nonflammable Cryogens}
The extensive use of large amounts of nonflammable cryogenics in both
magnets and rf structures presents special problems, but similar to
those solved at RHIC and other accelerator facilities.  Portions of
these cryogenic systems will reside in machine enclosures and present
oxygen deficiency hazards (ODH).  As was done for the cryogenic
components in RHIC, the ASME Boiler Code will be used in design, as
previously described in the RHIC SAD. The Oxygen Deficiency Hazards
Subject Area \cite{esh:1} will be followed to implement worker controls in
operations.

\subsection{Use of Flammable Cryogens}
The use of ionization cooling in a liquid-hydrogen (LH$_2$) medium
presents significant fire and explosion hazards.  Also, the LH$_2$ cells
will be interleaved with RF structures and magnets that handle a great
deal of electrical energy.  In the past, BNL has successfully used
stringent review procedures involving an internal Cryogenic Safety
Committee, as well as external review committees of experienced
individuals, to provide advice on the design basis and management of
cryogenic systems. Because of the high level of hazard nature and
expected large volume of LH$_2$ an intensive process of safety review
will begin at the earliest reasonable stage in the design process.

\subsection{Muon Storage Ring Life Safety (Egress) Considerations}
The Muon Storage Ring (MuSR), as defined for this study, constitutes a long above-grade
tunnel sloped at $13.1{}^{\circ}$ with respect to the
horizontal.  The fire protection/egress considerations of this
configuration will need to be evaluated for life safety by a fire
protection professional, and others, for adequacy.  Plans will need to
be made for the evacuation of any injured or ill personnel through the
sloped arcs.

\subsection{Muon Storage Ring Slope Hazards}
The relatively steep slope of the MuSR presents unique hazards 
during operation
as well as during construction. There will be safety engineering
considerations involved with moving heavy machine components and 
equipment to
support installation and maintenance. The surface of the finished
floor should be made sufficiently rough to provide good traction to
individuals wearing ordinary shoes.  Gutters should be provided to
direct water flowing into the tunnel toward the large sump pits at the
lower end.  They might also be designed to retard the unwanted
downhill movement of large items, particularly that of any portable
pieces of equipment on wheels.  An idea that might address this, and
other considerations, is to arrange the gutters in a spiral fashion,
regularly crossing the tunnel to direct such items toward one of the
walls.  Regular tie-down points for heavy items of equipment could be
provided.  These problems can be solved if they are addressed early in
the design process.

\section[Prompt and Residual Radiation Safety]{Prompt and Residual Radiation Safety During Operation of the Facility}
\subsection{Proton Driver}
\subsubsection{Production Target and Prompt Radiation Shielding}
\label{sec:esh:mokhov}
The conceptual target design is a 5 mm radius liquid mercury jet with
a velocity of 30 m/s.  The jet is tilted vertically downward at an
angle of 100 mrad with respect to a 20 T solenoidal field.  A 24 GeV
proton beam with an rms radius of 1.5 mm, tilted vertically downward at
an angle of 67 mrad with respect to that same solenoidal field,
collides with the mercury jet 45 cm from the jet nozzle.  That 45 cm
distance is to the intersection of the jet and beam centers; due to
the finite diameter of the jet and the beam, they interact over a range
of 15 cm to 75 cm from the nozzle.  The nozzle is embedded in an iron
pole face which helps control the uniformity of the solenoidal field,
and the proton beam enters through that same pole face.  Every
400 ms, 6 bunches of $1.7\times10^{13}$ protons each, separated by 20
ms, will hit the mercury jet target.

The Proton Driver and the Neutrino Factory Target Station will require
massive amounts of hadron shielding, similar in scale and type to that
of other proton accelerators in this energy and intensity regime.
Detailed calculations made using MARS have already been performed to
assess the prompt radiation inside the target hall to 
determine the amount of shielding required for a similar proposal made
by Fermilab \cite{esh:2}.  The transport of beam from the synchrotron
to the Target Station poses no unusual problems with respect to
prompt radiation shielding, although a deployment of a Design Basis
Accident (DBA) and Beam Loss Scenario, as was done for the RHIC Project,
is needed to complete the detailed design of shielding for the various
regions of the beamline \cite{esh:3}. This is also needed for analysis 
of the
existing AGS ring, to model the current infrastructure to asses the need 
for additional or 
upgraded shielding and penetrations.

The Proton Driver, under maximal operation, will handle an expected
7-14 times the beam power of the present AGS complex.  Since the
impacts to the AGS ring would scale roughly with the beam power,
modifications to handle such a large upgrade are planned.  Direct
injection to AGS from a new 1200 MeV Linac instead of the existing Booster,
coupled with the improved transition crossing jump,
should lead to lesser beam losses during the acceleration and ejection
of beams.  Therefore, it is assumed that the normal beam loss per
second in the AGS will remain at, or less than, the current level.  The
handling of this large beam power has already received, and merits,
careful attention.  Efforts should continue to better control such
losses of beam both from the standpoint of component activation and
also with respect to soil and groundwater impacts.

Because BNL resides on a Sole Source Aquifer, activation of soil and
contamination of groundwater are both considerations near the target
station. The amount of high density shielding, \textit{i.e.} steel and  tungsten,
must be optimized to mitigate production of $^3$H and $^{22}$Na along with
moisture barriers to prevent migration of these isotopes to the water
table.

A study to assess shielding of prompt radiation from the storage ring
was performed using MARS. \cite{esh:15} For a muon beam momentum of 20
GeV/{\it c}, $2\times10^{20}$ muons per year decay in the
storage ring. The straight section is 126 m long, and the arcs
are each 53 m, for 180$^o$ of rotation, (16.87 m radius). The BNL
administrative design criteria for control of off-site radiation dose
equivalent is 5 mrem/yr, and the drinking water standard in DOE Order
5400.5 requires less than 1 pCi/mL tritium and 0.2 pCi/mL $^{22}$Na. For
shielding calculations, the Fermilab wet soil properties were used
with the density of 2.24 g/cm$^3$ and scaled to the BNL value of 1.9
g/cm$^3$. For neutrino-induced radiation, the soil density is negligible;
therefore the results are transferable to BNL soil. Using the above
assumptions the required soil thicknesses scaled to the BNL soil
density of 1.9 g/cm$^3$ are listed below \cite{esh:15}:

\begin{figure}[!tb]
 \begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=0.75\textwidth]{../template/report/ps-and-eps/ESH-010411-f1.eps}
\caption[Neutrino-induced dose around the arcs ]{Neutrino-induced dose around 
the arcs as a function of the distance from the arc.}
  \label{fig:esh:radlev}
\end{center}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item During normal operation, and with a design criterion of 0.25 mrem/h for 
  occupancy in the underground facilities (electronics rooms, etc.),
  there must be at least 8.3 m of shielding outward from the arc
  tunnel enclosure, and 3 m of shielding on all other sides of the
  tunnel. The radiation that is being shielded from this source is due to
  electron showers.
\item For groundwater protection from radiation due to electron
  showers, a geomembrane is required to prevent water flow within 1.8
  m of the tunnel in all directions.  In addition, there must be a
  geomembrane preventing water flow through a region extending 3.5 m
  from the end of each straight section in the downstream beam direction 
  of those
  straight sections.  As for neutrino-induced activation, it results
  in radionuclide concentrations a factor of 800 below BNL-imposed
  limits for tritium, and even lower for $^{22}$Na.
\item To meet the off-site radiation requirement of 5 mrem/yr due to
  neutrino-induced radiation, a plane extending 30 m from the outside
  of the arc tunnel enclosure, within a band $\pm$10 cm from the orbit
  plane, must be kept on-site (see Fig.~\ref{fig:esh:radlev}).  In
  addition, an ellipsoid of 2 m half-width, 1300 m long, the long axis
  extending in the direction of the production straight, must be kept
  within the site (see Fig.~\ref{fig:esh:neuellip} and discussion in
  Section~\ref{sec:esh:radneu}).
\end{itemize}

\subsubsection{Residual Radioactivity at the Target Station}
Given the high beam power, the residual activation of the Target
Station merits special attention.  The residual absorbed dose rates to
be found in the Target Station are not presently known in detail, but
will be large, of the order of krads h$^{-1}$ (tens of Sv h$^{-1}$).
There will also be significant activation of water used to cool the
non-cryogenic components.  Remote handling capabilities of the
style used by other facilities, such as the Los Alamos Neutron Science
Center (LANSCE) and those planned for the Spallation Neutron Source
(SNS) at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, will be needed.

Fission products will be produced from the primary interactions of
protons on elemental mercury, resulting in a source term of volatile
and non-volatile radionuclides. Air activation will be enhanced by the
neutrons that will be produced from (p, Hg) interactions. Some of the
isotopes produced in the target will exceed the thresholds for a
Non-reactor Nuclear Facility.  Therefore, the target will require
compliance with 10 CFR 830 Nuclear Safety Management and a funding agency
approved Safety Analysis Report. Nuclear Facilities are subject to
levels of safety analysis, quality assurance, and training
requirements that are significantly more stringent than those normally
applied to accelerator facilities.  The present DOE definition of a
Nonreactor Nuclear Facility excludes accelerators, such that the
balance of the complex will remain regulated under the Accelerator
Safety Order, DOE 420.2.  Definition of the facility as a nuclear
facility needs to be resolved.  The target station, from a regulatory
standpoint, should be segregated from the rest of the facility to the
extent possible.  The Laboratory continues to monitor the ongoing
development of federal requirements on this topic.

\subsubsection{Airborne Radioactivity}
The production of airborne radioactivity in the vicinity of the Target
Station will constitute the dominant source of airborne radioactivity
emissions for the  Neutrino Factory.  At this early stage, a comparison
with the work already done by Fermilab on the NuMI Target Station
\cite{esh:6} may be useful, since the beam powers of the two facilities
are comparable, although the source term for the Hg target is likely
to exceed that from the Fermilab analysis of a carbon target and the site
boundary distance may be different.  The NuMI Target Station in the
Fermilab proposal will operate at a beam power of 0.404 MW.  It will
release a total of about 15 Ci (555 GBq) annually.  This is dominated
by 5 Ci (185 GBq) of $^{11}$C (half-life = 20.3 min.) and 9.8 Ci (363 GBq)
of $^{41}$Ar (half-life = 1.83 hours).  Such releases will result in an
annual dose equivalent of about 0.009 mrem ($0.09\,\mu$Sv) at the
Fermilab site boundary. An evaluation of the offsite dose equivalent
from airborne releases from the BNL design is required to assess
whether 0.1 mrem ($1~\mu$Sv) in one year may occur. If reaching that threshold
is possible at the site boundary from the new beamlines at BNL, then a
NESHPS Permit must be submitted.  A continuous monitoring program and
other requirements are specified by U. S. Environmental Protection
Agency Regulations.~\cite{esh:7} The monitoring program will have to
be designed to demonstrate that the regulatory limit of 10 mrem ($100~\mu$Sv) in one year is not exceeded.  The design of the beam
enclosure ventilation system will have to maximize the decay in
transit and/or filtration from the point of production to the point(s)
of release.

\subsubsection{Radioactivity in Soil and Groundwater}
The calculation of the radioactivity produced in the soil for the entire
facility can be accomplished using current versions of Monte-Carlo
shielding codes. As stated above, the Target Station is the most
significant source. The impact of the beam loss on soil and ground
water will be reassessed for new beamlines, as well as the AGS Complex,
as part of the design process.

\subsection{Cooling Stages and Muon Acceleration Stages}
In the cooling stages, the collected muons from pion decays will
deposit considerable energy in the LH$_2$ cells in the course of being
``cooled.''  This energy will end up largely in the form of heat
transferred to the hydrogen and dispersed by the refrigeration
equipment.  Given the low energy of the muons at this stage, only
energy loss by ionization is important.  It is straightforward to
design shielding appropriate to ranging out ``stray'' muons that might
miss the cooling apparatus as well as the electromagnetic cascades
induced by their decay electrons.  Present Monte-Carlo codes are
adequate to provide accurate calculations of this effect. The
forward-peaked nature of the muon decay field should minimize the lateral
extent of the shielding necessary.  The production of induced
radioactivity in these stages is also severely limited by the energy,
and the fact that leptons are the only particles present.  At the
higher energy stages, the scale of the muon shielding required will
increase, but even the final muon energy is still relatively low
since the mean range of a 50 GeV muon in soil is only about 109
m.  Likewise the size and importance of the electromagnetic
cascades produced by the decay electrons will grow as the energy
increases.  Radioactivation could be expected, but at levels much
smaller than those to be experienced in the Proton Driver and Target
Station.

\subsection{Muon Storage Ring}
\subsubsection{Control of Radiation Dose Due to Neutrinos}
\label{sec:esh:radneu}
\begin{figure}[!tb]
  \centering\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{../template/report/ps-and-eps/ESH-010411-f2.eps}
  \caption[Schematic representation of the neutrino radiation in the MuSR.]{Schematic representation of the neutrino radiation fields
    due to muon decays in the MuSR.  The gray region is the earth
    while the cross-hatched region is a schematic representation of
    the region inside of a selected contour of equal dose equivalent
    due to the neutrinos resulting from downward muon decays.  A
    similar neutrino radiation lobe is to be found in the upward
    direction due to upward muon decays in the other straight section
    of the ring.  The parameter {\it L} describes the intersection of this
    isodose contour with the centerline of the neutrino beam
    trajectory, while {\it R} is its maximum radial extent.  The actual
    contours are more forward-peaked, and narrower than this symbolic
    ellipse.  Symmetry about the centerline of the neutrino
    trajectories is expected.}
  \label{fig:esh:neuellip}
\end{figure}
The most unusual radiation consideration pertaining to the Muon
Storage Ring is that due to the neutrinos produced by the decaying
muons.  Obviously, the design of the entire facility is optimized
toward the production of a high fluence of neutrinos in the intended
direction downward (westward).  This also results, unavoidably, in a
similar stream of neutrinos in the upward direction.  The methods for
calculating radiation dose equivalent from the neutrino fluence have
been described elsewhere\cite{esh:9},\cite{esh:10}.  The Department of
Energy has specified annual limits on the radiation dose
equivalent that can be received by occupational workers and members of
the public \cite{esh:11}.  These limits rather clearly refer to the
dose equivalent that could plausibly be delivered to actual people.
For individual members of the public, the limit in DOE Order 5400.5 is
100 mrem (1~mSv) in a year, not including man-made, medical, or
enhanced natural radioactivity.  Special reporting requirements apply
when the annual dose equivalent received by an individual exceeds 10
mrem (0.1 mSv) in a year.  For comparison, the average annual
radiation dose equivalent received by individuals living in the United
States from natural sources of radiation, including exposure to radon
indoors, is about 300 mrem ($3000\,\mu$Sv)~\cite{esh:12}.
Figure~\ref{fig:esh:neuellip} schematically shows the ``lobe'' of
neutrino radiation due to neutrinos produced by muon decays in the
downward (westward) production straight section of the MuSR.  The
parameters {\it L} and {\it R} describe the length and maximum radius of a chosen
contour of equal annual dose equivalent.  {\it L} is measured from the end
of the MuSR straight section along the centerline of the neutrino
trajectory, while {\it R} is measured perpendicular to the neutrino
trajectory.  Cylindrical symmetry should hold about this axis for this
radiation field.  Due the extreme forward peaking, the dose equivalent
at the surface due to these neutrinos is zero.  A similar radiation
field will penetrate the surface due to muon decays in the upward
(eastward) return straight section of the MuSR centered about the axis
of the return straight section.  Mokhov has calculated these radiation
fields and has plotted the results for two different contours of
annual dose equivalent, 1 mSv (100 mrem) and 0.1 mSv (10 mrem)
\cite{esh:13}.  As stated in Section~\ref{sec:esh:mokhov} and as
applied to BNL, to meet the off-site radiation requirement of 5
mrem/yr due to neutrino-induced radiation, a plane extending 30 m from
the outside of the arc tunnel enclosure, within a band $\pm$10 cm from
the orbit plane, must be kept on-site (see Fig.~\ref{fig:esh:radlev}).
In addition, an ellipsoid of 2~m half-width, 1300~m long, the long
axis extending in the direction of the production straight, must be
kept within the site. In that regard, because the eastern site
boundary is 2200~m away, the required distance of 1300~m to the east of the proposed location
for the storage ring is well within the BNL site boundary. At the BNL
site boundary the trajectory of the neutrino cone puts it at an elevation 
of 335 m.  It can reasonably be assumed that a high-rise building that
large will not be built, and no occupancy will occur in that aperture.

\subsubsection{Other Radiation Sources}
The bombardment of the walls of the MuSR components will involve a
nearly uniform irradiation by electrons.  Calculations of both the
energy deposition in the superconducting magnets and the induced
radioactivity due to these electromagnetic cascades were performed by
Mokhov \cite{esh:14}.  Residual dose equivalent rates due to these
cascades will be small, less than about 1 mrem h$^{-1}$ ($10\,\mu$Sv
h$^{-1}$) after a 30 day irradiation and a 1 day cooldown.  It is
conceivable for the muons stored in the MuSR to be catastrophically lost
in the event of a sudden power outage or some other failure of the
magnets.  However, given the orbit time of 6 $\mu$s, and the
likely inductive time constants of the magnets, the loss of the muons
during such an event would be distributed over many turns and large
portions of the ring.  Only a tiny fraction of them would be directed
in a manner such that they penetrate the surface.  Further calculations
should be made to demonstrate this.  It is certain that the near
detector halls will be exclusion areas during operations due to
neutrinos as well as the other background sources that are unavoidably
present.

\section[Non-Radiological Environmental Protection Issues]{Non Radiological Environmental Protection Issues During Operation}
\subsection[Proton Driver, Target Station, Cooling and Acceleration]{Proton Driver, Target Station, Cooling Region, and Muon
  Acceleration Linacs} The issues are straightforward ones related to
the control of non-radioactive wastes.  Efforts should be made to
prevent the creation of regulated mixed or hazardous wastes and to
control environmental spills.  Surface-water discharges should be
managed in accordance with current Laboratory policies and any New
York State SPDES permits already in place. In general, management of
regulated materials will be via the ISO 14001 EMS.

\subsection{Muon Storage Ring}
The location of the MuSR over a Sole Source Aquifer demands especially
stringent protection against spills.  Careful attention to these
problems and employment of EMS elements during the design and
construction phases, should lead to their successful solution.

\section{Summary}
The Neutrino Factory provides a number of challenges in the area of
environment, safety, and health.  Many of these have been encountered,
and effectively addressed, at BNL and other accelerator laboratories.
Some of the problems are common to technological advancements in other
accelerators worldwide.  For these, collaborative efforts should
continue to develop and improve the solutions that are needed.  This
project raises a few new issues that must be addressed.  Continued
attention to these issues is anticipated as the project proceeds.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{esh:1} Brookhaven National Laboratory Standards Based
  Management System (SBMS), www.sbms.bnl.gov.
  
\bibitem{esh:2} N.V.~Mokhov, \textsl{Particle Production and Radiation Fields
  at a Neutrino Factory Target Station}, presentation at BNL, January
  29-31, 2001.
  
\bibitem{esh:3} A.~Stevens, S.~Musolino, and M.~Harrison, \textsl{Design
  Criteria For Prompt Radiation Limits on the Relativistic Heavy Ion
  Collider Site}, Health Physics, 66, (1994), 300-304.
  
\bibitem{esh:4} M.~Barbier, \textsl{Induced Radioactivity}, (North-Holland
  Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London, Wiley Interscience
  Division, John Wiley and Sons, Inc, New York, 1969).
  
\bibitem{esh:5} U. S. Department of Energy, \textsl{Nuclear Safety Analysis
  Reports}, DOE Order 5480.23, April 30, 1992.  The classification
  criteria specified in this Order are provided in a DOE Standard,
  \textsl{Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for
  Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports},
  DOE-STD-1027-92 Change Notice No. 1, September 1997.  The criteria
  are augmented by additional radionuclides in LA-12981-MS, UC-940,
  \textsl{Table of DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard 3 Threshold Quantities for the
  ICRP-30 List of 757 Radionuclides}, Los Alamos National Laboratory
  Report, August 1995.
  
\bibitem{esh:6} N.L.~Grossman, D.J.~Boehnlein, and J.D.~Cossairt,
  \textsl{Production and Release of Airborne Radionuclides Due to the
  Operation of NuMI}, Fermilab Report TM-2089, August 1999.
  
\bibitem{esh:7} United States Code of Federal Regulations, Title 40,
  Part 61, Subpart H, \textsl{National Emissions Standard for Hazardous Air
  Pollutants (NESHAP) for the Emission of Radionuclides other than
  Radon from Department of Energy Facilities}, 1989.
  
\bibitem{esh:8} J.D.~Cossairt, \textsl{Use of a Concentration-Based Model
  for Calculating the Radioactivation of Soil and Groundwater at
  Fermilab}, Fermilab Environmental Protection Note 8, December 1994
  and J. D. Cossairt, A. J. Elwyn, P. Kesich, A.  Malensek, N. Mokhov,
  and A. Wehmann, \textsl{The Concentration Model Revisited}, Fermilab
  Environmental Protection Note 17, June 1999.
  
\bibitem{esh:9} J.D.~Cossairt, N.L.~Grossman, and E.T.~Marshall,
  \textsl{Assessment of Dose Equivalent Due to Neutrinos}, Health Physics 73
  (1997) 894-898.
  
\bibitem{esh:10} N.V.~Mokhov and A.~Van~Ginneken, \textsl{Neutrino Induced
  Radiation at Muon Colliders}, presented at the 1999 Particle
  Accelerator Conference, New York, New York, March 19-April 2, 1999,
  FERMILAB-Conf-99/067.
  
\bibitem{esh:11} U. S. Department of Energy, \textsl{Radiation Protection of
  the Public and the Environment}, DOE Order 5400.5, January 7, 1993.
  
\bibitem{esh:12} National Council on Radiation Protection and
  Measurements, Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the
  United State and Canada from Natural Background Radiation, NCRP
  Report No. 94, December 1987.
  
\bibitem{esh:13} N.V.~Mokhov, private communication, January 2000.
  
\bibitem{esh:14} N.V.~Mokhov, \textsl{Radiation Load on Muon Storage Ring
  Magnets}, presentation given at Fermilab, January 25, 2000.
  
\bibitem{esh:15} N.V.~Mokhov, Fermilab email communication to J.S.~Berg,
  Radiation around Storage Ring, April 2, 2001.

\end{thebibliography}

%\end{document}

