



Mercury Target Issues and Development Program

Neutrino Factory and Muon Collider Collaboration
Targetry R&D Meeting

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Outline




- Comparison Between SNS and Neutrino Factory Target Requirements
- Key Issues and R&D implemented to address them
 - Removal of time-averaged power
 - Handling pulsed beam loads
 - Materials compatibility and irradiation damage
- Hg processing and storage of radioactive byproducts
- Comments on Safety Categorization and R&D for Neutrino Factory and Muon Collider

SNS Mercury Target Requirements




- 2 MW average proton beam power
- 1 GeV protons
- Pulse duration $\sim 0.5 \mu\text{s}$
- 60 Hz rep rate
- Resulting target loads
 - Energy deposition per pulse $\sim 33 \text{ kJ}$
 - Peak time-averaged current on target 0.25 A/m^2
 - Peak time-averaged power flux on target vessel $\sim 600 \text{ MW/m}^3$
 - Peak time-averaged power flux from vessel to Hg $\sim 1 \text{ MW/m}^2$
 - Peak energy deposition in Hg $\sim 800 \text{ MW/m}^3$

Comparison of Heat Loads




SNS Target Configuration



Mercury Loop Flow Parameters @ 2 MW




• Power absorbed in Hg	1.2 MW
• Nominal Operating Pressure	0.3 MPa (45 psi)
• Flow Rate	340 kg/s
• $V_{\max}$ (In Window)	3.5 m/s
• Temperature	
– Inlet to target	60°C
– Exit from target	90°C
• Total Hg Inventory	1.4 m ³ (20 tons)
• Pump Power	56 kW (75 HP)



SNS Hg Target
operates at low
temperature and
pressure

Hg Process Loop




Key Issues for the SNS Mercury Target



- **Steady state power handling**
 - Cooling of target/enclosure window - wettability
 - Hot spots in Hg caused by recirculation around flow baffles
- **Thermal Shock**
 - Pressure pulse loads on structural material
 - Effects on bulk Hg flow
- **Radiation damage to structural materials**
- **Compatibility between Hg and other target system materials**
- **Demonstration of key systems:**
 - **Mercury loop operation**
 - **Remote handling**

Some SNS Hg Target R&D Facilities, capabilities, and expertise might be directly applicable to neutrino factory

Mercury Target Development




WTHL



MTHL



TTF



LANSCe-WNR
Hg Target Tests

Mercury Process Cell at TTF



Materials R&D



- An aggressive materials R&D program has been developed for Target Systems
 - Technical issues:
 - Radiation induced embrittlement by p and n fluxes
 - Effects of high He and H transmutation rates on properties
 - Thermal gradient mass transfer in Hg
 - Liquid metal embrittlement
 - Interactions of radiation effects and compatibility processes.
 - Facilities: LANSCE, SINQ, TIF, HFIR
 - Hg Loops and other test devices involving Hg have been built at ORNL.

Materials Qualification Tests



Test \ Item	Energy	Dose	He	H	Hg	Thick	Stress	Fatigue
SNS	high	high	high	high	flow	√	√	√
TIF 3- Beam	low	high	high	high				
TIF p-Beam	low	low			static*		?	
LANSCE	high	high	high	high		√		
SINQ	high	high	high	high		√		
HFIR	low	high	high			√		
TC Loop					flow	√		
LME Tensile					static	√	√	
LME Fatigue					static	√		√

* Low flow rate upgrade may be possible

0 Typical for SNS

? Possible relevance to SNS

Hg processing and handling of radioactive byproducts




- Mercury lasts the entire 40 year lifetime of SNS with no changeout required
 - “Burn-up” over 40 years is only ~ 0.1%
 - Most conversion is from one Hg isotope to another
 - Tritium production rate ~ 8 kCi/year
- No filtering required; tritium released from Hg to absorption system

Safety Issues for SNS Hg Target



- SNS Target Region is a a Hazard Category 2 Nuclear Facility
 - Inventory of certain radionuclides (primarily mercury isotopes) exceed thresholds
- Mercury releases that exceed the site boundary limits are only possible if the mercury is at elevated temperature
- Safety Class Systems required to avoid elevated temperatures
 - Target Protection System used to trip the proton beam for abnormal loop conditions (high temperature or low flow)
 - Safety Class fire protection
 - Combustion Control program
 - 2 hour fire wall
 - fire suppression system
- Additional Safety Significant Equipment needed to protect workers

Hazard Category 2 Indices for SNS Hg Target




DOE Safety Documentation Requirements Differ for Nuclear and Accelerator Facilities




- Accelerator Facilities: DOE Order 420.2 and related guidance
 - Preliminary Safety Assessment Document (PSAD) required for design stage
 - Independent review required
 - Approval authority with project management
 - Includes facilities integrally connected to accelerator
 - DOE approval of the Accelerator Safety Envelope required prior to commissioning and/or operations.
- Nuclear Facilities: DOE Order 420.1, 10 CFR 830, DOE Standards 3009, 1027, 1019-24, and others
 - Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) required for nuclear facilities ... per DOE-STD-1027 this includes the SNS target and related facilities
 - Approval required before construction begins
 - DOE reviews and approves the PSAR
 - Approval of final SAR (FSAR) required for operation & commissioning

The Nuclear Facility Includes a Portion of the Target Building (1)



The Nuclear Facility Includes a Portion of the Target Building (4)



Section through target, monolith and neutron beam lines

PSAR Process Takes Significant Time & Resources, and Must Be Completed Prior to Construction



<u>Activity</u>	<u>Time</u>
Preparation by SNS and contractor	June – December 1999
DOE Review	January/February 2000
Approval (stipulated completion of chemical consequence analysis)	February 2000
Chemical hazard and fire accident analysis	May – August 2000
DOE Review of Chem/fire analysis	October 2000 (ongoing, approval expected soon)

Chemical Consequences Are More Limiting than Radiological



- WORKER, accident limit:
 - Toxicity limit for infrequent accidents is 10 mg/m³ for 0.5-hours (IDLH -- “immediately dangerous to life and health”)
 - Rad dose due to 10 mg/m³ for 0.5-hours (long lived Hg isotopes) = 4 rem (within 10 CFR 835 annual limit)
- PUBLIC: accident limit does not exist (SNS plans to propose 2 mg/m³ for “ERPG-2” limit)
 - Toxicity “limit” is 2 mg/m³ for 1-hour exposure (proposed ERPG-2)
 - Rad dose due to 2 mg/m³ for 1-hour = 1.6 rem [DOE’s “evaluation guideline” (max limit) is 25-rem for public exposure to infrequent accidents]
- Bottom line: For accidents, the toxicity consideration is more limiting by factor of approximately 10.

The Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG) Values



- The Emergency Response Planning Guideline-2 (ERPG-2) value is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.

Comments on Using a Hg Target for Neutrino Factory



- Must carefully define requirements, and a Hg target conceptual design that meets these requirements
 - Until this is done, efforts are likely to flounder and could be irrelevant in the end
 - Derive feasibility issues
 - Define R&D program that addresses critical feasibility issues
- Feasibility issues:
 - Hg jet formation and stability, especially in high B field, will be critical issue
 - How to re-establish jet before next beam pulse
 - Likely that others will result from conceptual design process
- Using mercury could significantly complicate the Environmental Impact Statement and Safety Analysis
 - Neutrino factory/muon collider will likely be a Nuclear Facility
- SNS facilities, capabilities, and expertise are available for the Neutrino Factory and Muon Collider Collaboration